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Language is a sensitive matter for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a fact made clear by the well-
documented mechanisms of party-state censorship and propaganda, which aim to repel criticism and set 
the agenda in the CCP’s favor. Less widely acknowledged, however, is the extent to which even terms of 
praise and devotion must be subjected to careful scrutiny in China. Two recent catchphrases in particular 
that speak anew to deeper anxieties about the image of the CCP and its top leader, Xi Jinping. These are 
“low-level red” and “high-level black,” odd phrases in English that invite some elucidation. The terms, 
which first emerged on the internet, refer in both cases to covert or unintentional acts of criticism. “Low-
level red,” or dijihong (低級紅), refers in official parlance to language or conduct that is intended to praise 
the Party or government, but which ultimately has the opposite effect because it is patently false, cheap, 
or ill-considered. “High-level black,” or gaojihei (高级黑), refers on the other hand to more deliberate 
and skilful acts of disguised sabotage, in which language is deployed in obscurely humorous ways, or 









Keywords: Censorship, CCP, Xi Jinping, Low-level red, High-level black, language, discourse, public 
opinion guidance, Xi Jinping Thought 
關鍵詞：審查，中共，習近平，低級紅，高級黑，語言，話語，輿論導向，習近平思想 
 
216                                              Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies, vol. 1 (2020) 
 
 
Language is a delicate matter for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). And nowhere 
is the leadership’s hypersensitivity to language more obvious than through the well-
documented mechanisms of party-state censorship and propaganda (Brady 2009, 9-
30) which, building on a much older tradition of CCP media control under Mao 
Zedong (2003), have since 1989 sought to maintain regime stability under the rubric 
of “public opinion guidance.” This is itself a raw-nerved reference, deeply tinged with 
insecurities about the Soviet collapse (Zhao 2010), to the press policies deemed by 
senior officials to have been fatally misguided in the run-up to the brutal suppression 
of the pro-democracy movement on June 4, 1989 (Qian 2009). Today, the same work 
of directing public views and restraining dissent is achieved through an elaborate and 
multi-layered system of technological and human controls, from daily and even hourly 
calls from propaganda officials to media outlets, to chat messages disappearing from 
social media in real time and the blocking of sensitive keywords (O’Neill 2009).  
Less widely acknowledged, however, is the extent to which even terms of praise and 
devotion must be subjected to careful scrutiny in China, lest they throw unwanted 
shade on the leadership. Insights into the CCP’s insecurities about praise and much 
else are possible thanks to another permutation of the Party’s hypersensitivity to lan-
guage – the production, on a constant basis, of an evolving canon of political discourse 
that for the careful observer can make its inner doubts more salient. Reading through 
official discourse, following László Ladányi’s counsel to “[look] at China through Chi-
nese spectacles,” and, above all, “read the small print,” (Ladányi w.y.) what glimpse do 
we have of the CCP’s state of mind?  
 
The “Core” is Sensitive 
There are two recent catchphrases in particular that speak anew to deeper anxieties 
about the image of the CCP and its top leader, Xi Jinping. These are “low-level red” 
and “high-level black,” odd phrases in English that invite some elucidation. The terms, 
which first emerged on the internet, refer in both cases to covert or unintentional acts 
of criticism. “Low-level red,” or dijihong (低级红), refers in official parlance to lan-
guage or conduct that is intended to praise the Party or government, but which 
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ultimately has the opposite effect because it is patently false, cheap, or ill-considered. 
Perhaps the most classic case of dijihong occurred in November 2018 as He Yinli, a 
Chinese runner competing in the Suzhou Marathon, was interrupted by a race volun-
teer who handed her a Chinese flag during her final sprint to the finish line (Zuo 2018). 
As a result of this interruption, she narrowly lost the race, and the incident became 
closely associated with “low-level red” – in this case, a cheap display of nationalism or 
pro-Party feeling that backfired in its absurdity. “High-level black,” or gaojihei (高级
黑), refers on the other hand to more deliberate and skilful acts of disguised sabotage, 
in which language is deployed in obscurely humorous ways, or cloaked in academic 
respectability, in order to criticise or ridicule. In other cases, “high-level black” may 
involve interpreting CCP ideals, principles, policies, and discourse in such a way as to 
achieve a critical, or “black,” result.  
Such acts of indirect or even unintended criticism may seem beneath the notice of 
high-level CCP leaders, who are presumably concerned with loftier and more pressing 
matters of national governance. But they are in fact regarded as a serious matter, mer-
iting clear and decisive action – but even more, clear and decisive language. This is 
why, when the CCP (2019) released in February 2019 its Opinion on the Strengthen-
ing of Party Construction (中共中央关于加强党的政治建设的意见), meant to pro-
mote stricter governance within the Party, the document included mention of both 
“low-level red” and “high-level black” (CCP 2019). Referring explicitly to the “two 
safeguards,” CCP jargon for the need to safeguard Xi Jinping as the “core” leader and 
to ensure the authority of the CCP’s Central Committee, the document read: “[We] 
must with correct recognition and correct action firmly exercise the ‘two safeguards,’ 
resolutely preventing and correcting all erroneous words and deeds that deviate from 
the ‘two safeguards.’ [We] must not engage in any form of ‘low-level red’ or ‘high-level 
black,’ and resolutely must not permit outer devotion and inner opposition toward the 
CCP Central Committee, allowing double-dealing or ‘pseudo-loyalty.’”  
Several months later, the official journal Seeking Truth (求是) commented that some 
officials tended to "over-simplify, vulgarise, go to extremes, or employ low-brow tactics 
to deceptively express 'pseudo-loyalty,'” in this way "drawing ridicule" (Wu 2019). 
What could account for such extreme insecurity over questions of sincerity?  
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One possible explanation is that this sensitivity results from Xi Jinping’s own position 
of waxing grandeur within the Party leadership, unprecedented in the reform era 
(Johnson 2010). Xi’s elevation, evidenced early in his first term, began in earnest in 
October 2016 with his designation as the “core” leader (以习近平同志为核心的党
中央) in the communiqué emerging from the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Com-
mittee (Buckley 2016). He was the first leader since Jiang Zemin to have been desig-
nated as the “core,” but the language, “powerful political currency,” signalled that Xi 
had in fact attained a level of personal power not seen since Deng Xiaoping and Mao 
Zedong. There were signs in early 2017, months in advance of the 19
th
 National Con-
gress of the CCP, that Xi Jinping’s still unannounced “banner term,” the political catch-
phrase used to encompass his policies and legacy, might be the first since “Deng 
Xiaoping Theory” (邓小平理论), to include his personal name, something neither 
Jiang Zemin nor Hu Jintao had managed with the “Three Represents” (三个代表) 
and “Scientific View of Development” (科学发展观), respectively (Qian 2012). By 
the time the Congress commenced in October 2017, Xi’s moves to assert and secure 
his personal dominance were clear. His new banner term, “Xi Jinping Thought on 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社
会主义思想), indeed bore his name (what Chinese political scholars referred to as an 
act of “crowning”), and would need only slight abbreviation to become “Xi Jinping 
Thought” (习近平思想), putting China’s latest “core” leader on the same level as Mao 
Zedong. The banner term, and therefore Xi’s name, was formally added to the CCP’s 
constitution. “China tilts back towards a cult of personality,” reported the Financial 
Times (2017b). Term limits on the state presidency – the only limits to which Xi was 
subject – were removed from the state constitution months later at the National Peo-
ple’s Congress.  
Since Xi has consolidated power, stacking the CCP leadership with acolytes and asso-
ciates (Financial Times 2017a), dispensing with the façade of collective leadership, and 
effectively taking China back to the era of “personalistic rule” (Shirk 2018) few have 
dared to criticise him. To the extent that China has returned under Xi to “an orthodox 
form of personalist authoritarianism,” (Düben 2018) turning away from consensus-
driven collective leadership, the substance of power relies increasingly on its 
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manufacture through rituals of loyalty-signaling more reminiscent of the pre-reform 
era (Qian 2020). Sincerity is crucial in this context because the genuine participation 
of CCP officials in rituals of leader worship is a way of achieving the key function of 
coordination with the “core” leader’s agenda. In a 2018 case study on the leadership 
cult of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, scholar Xavier Márquez (2018, 265) might have 
been talking about Xi Jinping’s China as he addressed the “persuasive aspects of cult 
messages,” the “construction of charismatic authority,” and the need for credible par-
ticipation (my emphasis):   
From this point of view, what is most striking about leader cults is not the pro-
duction or over-production of particular positive representations of the leader, 
the exclusion of alternative images, or even the excessive praise addressed to 
the leader in official media, but the degree to which many people participate in 
rituals of leader worship, where they are expected not merely to consume leader 
propaganda passively but to act in ways that credibly indicate high levels of re-
spect, or even adoration, for the leader. Here, as we shall see, the key function 
of a leader cult as a political strategy is coordination, and the main question of 
interest concerns the way in which participation in such rituals signals support 
or enhances commitments to the leader or some larger group, including the 
state. 
As Márquez (2018, 266) suggests, the act of signalling, a form of participation, is abso-
lutely critical in the "construction of charismatic authority." This, I suspect, is also 
where the CCP’s redoubled sensitivity about sincerity enters the picture. It is important, 
when the manufacture of charismatic power displaces the need for consensus, to en-
sure that participation is heartfelt, and that it is not undermined through covert criti-
cism. The bricks of devotion must be built of stern stuff.  
The danger in the “new era” of charismatic power is that Party or government officials 
might simply parrot the “core” leader, or that they might resort to satire, twisting official 
discourse so as to achieve a critical effect. Or, alternatively, they might damage the 
Party’s credibility through excessive zeal. These fears of disproportionate praise were 
in fact sufficiently serious that in November 2017, right on the heels of the 19
th
 National 
Congress, the Party released a “Decision” on the implementation of the “spirit” of the 
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Congress(中共中央关于认真学习宣传贯彻党的十九大精神的决定) that included 
three phrases that could acceptably be used to describe the status of Xi Jinping (CCP 
2017). The phrases were: “Endorsed by the entire Party” (全党拥护); “loved and re-
spected by the people” (人民爱戴); and “fully worthy and deserving [of core leader-
ship status]” (当之无愧).  
Pause for a moment to consider the absurdity of the situation facing the CCP leader-
ship: the construction of legitimacy around charismatic leadership requires positive 
representations of the leader, and ever-mounting acts of adulation and loyalty-signaling; 
this language of praise must be sincere, lest disingenuousness (“high-level black”) be-
come an undermining force, or the power of the leader seem to be imposed; and 
finally, and here is where the dog seems to bite its tail, the language of praise must be 
carefully scripted so as to avoid the appearance of insincerity. Let that logic sink in for 
a moment. Scripted sincerity, mandated from on high. 
 
The Highs and Lows of Adulation 
Despite Xi Jinping’s apparent near-cult status, the evidence suggests the Chinese Com-
munist Party does not feel sufficiently secure to allow sincerity to speak for itself. One 
important case in point came shortly after the release of the list of acceptable phrases. 
On November 9, 2017, not long after the 19
th
 National Congress, Guizhou’s Qianxi-
nan Daily (黔西南日报), a local CCP paper, published a front page that included an 
airbrushed image of Xi Jinping with the caption, “Great Leader General Secretary Xi 
Jinping.” The term “great leader,” or weida lingxiu (伟大领袖), has been used in the 
past only to refer to Mao Zedong, and this extreme expression of loyalty to Xi was a 
step too far – particularly as overweening propaganda (and plans already announced 
to scrap presidential term limits) put the Party on the defensive over the apparent re-
emergence of a cult of personality (Reuters 2017).  




Page One of the May 1, 1974, edition of the People’s Liberation Army Daily 
Though the “great leader” reference appeared in a small regional paper, it was shared 
with undertones of scorn on Chinese social media, and it did not escape notice by 
Hong Kong media and overseas Chinese websites (Yang 2017). This was a point of 
embarrassment for senior leaders, and Qianxinan Daily was forced to quietly remove 
the front page from its online archive, replacing it with a fake version. So much for 
sincerity. Was the Qianxinan Daily use of “great leader” a case of “high-level black,” 
intended to damn Xi Jinping through insincere enthusiasm? Or was it a case of true 
sincerity, so intensely felt that a local leader lost all sense of proportion? To recap, 
there is a word for such an embarrassment of praise: “low-level red.”  
As new formulations in the official discourse, “low-level red” and “high-level black” 
might be seen as symptoms of this renewed sensitivity over the terms of power-signal-
ing as charismatic authority comes to dominate the political field in China. At first 
glance, their presence might seem oddly out of place. After all, why should such inse-
curities come to the fore at the very moment when Xi Jinping’s position seems assured? 
But these dynamics of power and insecurity will not seem strange to anyone with a 
grasp of CCP history. The drive for overarching control can lead to an almost com-
pulsive fear of criticism hiding between the lines, and of peril lurking in the smile. 
There are many such cases in the history of media in the People’s Republic of China, 
most taking us back to the pre-reform era. And one of the most illustrative for Xi’s 
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“new era” might be the so-called “Black Box Scandal” (黑框事件) that unfolded in 
1974 at the Liberation Army Daily (解放军报), the official mouthpiece of China’s 
military and one of three publications dominating the press during the Cultural Revo-
lution.  
 
Reading Peril Between the Lines 
The scandal at the Liberation Army Daily, which ultimately would result in the dis-
grace of two editors, was unknown to staff at the paper until a meeting was urgently 
called in the newspaper’s conference room on the evening of July 8, 1974 (Zhang 
2015). When the paper’s senior editors had finally gathered, a deputy editor from the 
Criticise Lin Biao, Criticise Confucius Office (批林批孔辦公室) sternly presented 
them with a copy of the May 19 edition. He spoke of an unacceptable “overlap” be-
tween page one and page two. Page one of the edition included two photographs of 
Mao Zedong meeting with Makarios III, the first President of the Republic of Cyprus. 
In one of these images, the leaders were shaking hands. In the second image, Mao was 
seated in a semi-circle with Makarios III and several others, including his translator.  
 
Page One of the November 9, 2017, edition of the Qianxinan Daily. 
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Both photographs were acceptable. What could possibly be the problem? Page two 
of the edition included several reports, including one about an earthquake in Yunnan 
and Sichuan provinces. But the issue was with an obituary printed at the bottom right-
hand side of the page. This was for Lu Han, a respected former Kuomintang general 
who had defected to the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, an obvious point of pride 
for the PLA. The photo of Lu was surrounded by a thick black box, typical in China 
for photos of the deceased.  
 
The inside page of the May 1, 1974, edition of the People’s Liberation Army Daily, 
with an image of deceased general Lu Han. 
The problem had nothing to do with language. Each page was fine on its own. But the 
trouble became clear when the paper was held up, as many readers might do, and the 
black box around the image of General Lu Han on the inside page could be seen 
hemming in the image of Mao Zedong on the front page. 




Composite image of the first and second pages of the May 1, 1974, edition of the 
People’s Liberation Army Daily. 
Suddenly, the implications were catastrophic – an intimation of the death of Chairman 
Mao, an act of unspeakable carelessness. But it was not regarded as mere carelessness 
by the leadership. “The appearance of this problem is surely not an accident,” the 
paper’s editors were told. “This is a serious political error.” In fact, Jiang Qing, Mao 
Zedong’s wife, had demanded a full investigation of the scandal. An investigation was 
carried out, and two of the paper’s editors, Wu Yongchuan and Xue Zhen, were 
forced to make public admissions of guilt.  
The scandal resulted in another change at the newspaper. From that day forward, all 
page proofs had to be inspected carefully using a specially created desk with a bulb 
under a glass pane, allowing editors to spot any overlaps or juxtapositions that might 
suggest dissent or criticism. In an article in 2015, one of Wu Yongchuan’s former 
colleagues, Zhang Xinyang (2015), said this process, which involved what they called 
the “searchlight table” (探照桌), was even used to inspect the Chinese characters 
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appearing on the back sides of photos, ensuring words like “criticise” (批判) or “over-
throw” (打倒) were not printed atop images of Party leaders.  
“I think readers today would find it difficult to imagine such trials in getting a paper to 
press, or such a way of reading a newspaper,” Wu Yongchuan concluded in his own 
December 2000 account of the “Black Box Scandal.” At the turn of the century, how-
ever, China was in a period of evolving collective leadership, which also corresponded 
to a period of rapid commercialisation during which Chinese media were exploring 
their professional roles in a changing society. Openness was the name of the day, and 
journalists were ready to reimagine themselves. Censorship was ever-present, but the 
space for criticism – even for hard-nosed investigative reporting – could also be found.  
Fast forward to March 2016 and we have a case in Xi Jinping’s “new era” with aston-
ishing similarities to the “Black Box Scandal” and belying Wu Yongchuan’s sense of 
progress – around the question, no less, of press controls. 
 
The Soul of the Media 
On February 19, 2016, Xi Jinping paid a high-profile visit to three central-level “news 
units,” the People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, and China Central Television. By 
this point, just 15 months after he assumed leadership, Xi was already surrounded with 
an unmistakable halo of devotion, referred to fondly (even in song) as “Uncle Xi,” 
with a carefully crafted myth emerging around his past, including his youth in the coun-
tryside, and his image becoming nearly ubiquitous (Ramzy 2014). During Xi’s visit to 
Xinhua that day, one deputy editor, Pu Liye, found it impossible to restrain his adula-
tion. In a poem positively quivering with excitement, making reference to the “camel 
bells of the Belt and Road” (它伴随一带一路的驼铃), and to the “mighty wind of 
the high-speed rail” (以及巨轮高铁暖风浩荡), Pu wrote:  
General Secretary, my eyes follow in your wake, 总书记，您的背影我的目光 
And in these eyes, my verse takes shape. 我的目光催生这首诗 
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My mobile grows hot as my fingers move. 我的手指正让手机滚烫 
How long this verse of mine has brewed.  这首诗我酝酿了很久 (Bandurski 
2016) 
Devotion was also the chief message of Xi Jinping’s speech later that afternoon at a 
conference on “news and public opinion work” attended by propaganda officials and 
representatives from party-state media. Xi demanded the unquestioning obedience of 
the media, which he said must be “surnamed Party” – meaning that they must remain 
faithful to the CCP’s Central Committee and recognise that their role is to “love the 
Party, protect the Party, and serve the Party” (爱党、护党、为党).  
As love and devotion crested, inundating media and politics, it was difficult to escape 
the appearance of tawdriness. Pu Liye’s verses were the object of ridicule on the Chi-
nese internet, and in the Hong Kong media he was compared to the twentieth century 
poet-politician Guo Moruo, who “never forgot to eulogise [Mao Zedong for] his un-
precedented achievements and his unchallengeable leadership of the Chinese Revo-
lution” (Yang 2016, 147). As for the scandal that unfolded the next day at Southern 
Metropolis Daily, one of the country’s leading commercial newspapers, the jury is still 
out today on whether what happened was an intentional act of criticism by stealth, or 
merely a colossal error.  
For papers like the Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市报), which for more than a 
decade had managed to find some limited space for professional news coverage, some-
times running afoul of the leadership, Xi Jinping’s renewed claim to lordship over the 
media was a tragedy unfolding over many months, beginning in January 2013 with the 
Southern Weekly incident, in which authorities ultimately tamed what had long been 
regarded as China’s “greatest newspaper” (Repnikova/Fang 2015). But few dared to 
speak openly about the worsening of the CCP’s censorship regime.  
On the morning of February 20, the front page of the Shenzhen edition of Southern 
Metropolis Daily reported news of Xi Jinping’s media speech the previous day with a 
bold headline across the top of the page: “Party and Government Media are Propa-
ganda Positions and Must Be Surnamed Party” (党和政府主办的媒体是党和政府
的宣传阵地，必须姓党). This would have been mandated as the top news of the 
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day, to be given exactly this sort of prominent treatment. Directly underneath this 
headline was a photograph taking up most of the page that showed a funeral at sea 
held near Shenzhen for Yuan Geng, one of the chief founders of the Shekou Industrial 
Zone. Yuan had died two weeks earlier, and now his ashes were being scattered. The 
headline superimposed on the photograph read: “A Soul Returns to the Sea” (魂归
大海). 
 
Front page of the February 20, 2016, edition of the Shenzhen edition of Southern 
Metropolis Daily. 
As in the 1974 scandal at the PLA Daily, the problem was juxtaposition. Newspaper 
readers and Chinese internet users soon realised that the two headlines, if read verti-










Their Souls Return 
To The Sea 
Read in combination, the headlines seemed a desperate cry from journalists facing a 
level of Party control that fundamentally threatened their hopes of even marginal in-
dependence. Was this an intentional act of protest against the worsening information 
landscape under China’s new strongman? Or was this a garden-variety error, as in the 
case of the “Black Box Scandal”?  
Whatever the case, Liu Cuixia, the Southern Metropolis Daily news editor immedi-
ately responsible, was fired from her job, and the Nanfang Daily Group, the paper’s 
Party-run publisher, sent out a release internally to staff that called the incident “a 
serious matter of guidance” (BBC 2018). Interviewed anonymously by the New York 
Times, however, one of Liu’s colleagues suggested such an act of intentional sabotage 
would be unthinkable given the new level of controls facing media: “It can’t have been 
deliberate. It’s just very, very serious. And these days no one would dare to do some-
thing like that.” (Tatlow 2016) 
 
Circum-invention 
The problem with seriousness is that it begets ridicule in its most subtle forms. The 
CCP has grappled with this dilemma through much of its history. Consider the “veiled 
attacks” on Mao Zedong conceived in the early 1960s by the so-called “Three Family 
Village” (三家村), a trio of writers and senior propagandists consisting of Deng Tuo, 
Wu Han, and Liao Mosha (MacFarquhar 1997). It alleged that Deng, a poet who had 
served as editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily until 1958, had even “feigned a correct 
posture” while seemingly criticising a “reactionary” drama by Wu Han (Cheek 1981). 
Deng’s lampooning of Mao Zedong was “high-level black” of the highest order. 
Humor and subterfuge have also long been important characteristics of “online con-
tention,” which has supported a vibrant “meme culture,” employing “creative practices 
Bandurski: Working Around the CCP’s Insecurities                                                                     229 
 
 
that sidestep the mechanics of internet censorship in China.”(Yang 2009) One prom-
inent example in the 2000s was the emergence of the term “river crab,” or hexie (河
蟹), a homophone of the word “harmony” (和谐), to subtly critique Hu Jintao’s notion 
of the “harmonious society,” which had been used to justify internet censorship (An 
2014). Siu-yau Lee (2016, 1061) has referred to these as "satirical tactics," noting that 
“satirical campaigns are most likely to survive when activists adopt the tactic of ‘parodic 
satire,’ whereby activists mimic a specific practice of the state and skilfully transplant it 
to other contexts.”  
Cases of direct and outspoken criticism have become exceptionally rare in the Xi 
Jinping era. Back in April, Ren Zhiqiang, a prominent former real estate developer 
and CCP member, penned an article that circulated online criticising the substance of 
a February 23 teleconference on China’s response to the Covid-19 epidemic. Though 
not mentioning Xi Jinping by name, Ren implied both incompetence and a grasping 
desire for power. “I saw not an emperor standing there exhibiting his ‘new clothes,’” 
he wrote, “but a clown who stripped naked and insisted on continuing being emperor. 
Despite holding a series of loincloths up in an attempt to cover the reality of your 
nakedness, you don’t in the slightest hide your resolute ambition to be an emperor, or 
the determination to let anyone who won’t let you be destroyed.” (Rudolph 2020) Ren 
noted that attention in the February 23 meeting had focused on “great accomplish-
ments,” and that there had been an utter lack of critical opinions. Soon after the post 
circulated, Ren was incommunicado, apparently under detention. Finally, in April, the 
CCP announced that he was under investigation for “serious violations of discipline 
and law." 
But when criticism must hide, it becomes an invisible force – feared all the more for 
its ability to strike unanticipated, rising suddenly from the depths of public anger. This 
is the dilemma of charismatic power: that even as devotion surges, the beloved leader 
cannot feel entirely secure in the authenticity of the love to which he feels entitled. 
Sometimes, the emperor realises his own nakedness. He dreads the moment when 
the thin veil of deception falls in the midst of his grand procession – all because a child 
notices the obvious.  
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Hans Christian Andersen’s folktale of the vain emperor, the substance of Ren Zhiqi-
ang’s critique, was replayed in March this year in the city of Wuhan, ravaged by the 
coronavirus epidemic and the lockdown that followed. On March 5, Vice-Premier 
Sun Chunlan visited Wuhan ahead of a planned tour by Xi Jinping that was supposed 
to mark a key turning point in the “war” against the virus. At one point, as Sun and 
her entourage processed through a gated community of residential high-rises, residents 
shouted from their windows: “Fake! Fake! Everything is fake!” (假的! 假的! 都是假
的!) This was captured in a video that briefly spread like wildfire across Chinese social 
media, before being expunged from the internet inside China. The next day, the new 
top leader in Wuhan, Wang Zhonglin, surely embarrassed by the incident, was quoted 
in the local CCP newspaper as suggesting during an internal leadership meeting that 
there was a need to “carry out gratitude education among the citizens of the whole city,” 
giving them a greater appreciation of the efforts of Xi Jinping and the Party (Bandurski 
2020). Wang’s remarks became a full-blown crisis on the internet, necessitating an 
emergency video conference in which propaganda officials across the country assessed 
what had gone wrong in what was called “a classic case of public opinion created by 
our own work.” 
As outrageous as Wang’s remarks were, they perfectly illustrated the problem inherent 
in devotion politics. As an official deeply invested in the system, Wang understood 
implicitly that devotion was now the most valued currency. Understandably, he was 
eager not just to secure praise and validation for his own work and for Sun Chunlan, 
but to reflect it upwards to the “core” leader as well. But his crass exposure of this 
political culture of praise – which of course also was his own expression of devotion – 
ultimately became yet another instance of self-inflicted ridicule through excess of zeal. 
As one commentator wrote on an overseas Chinese news platform: "Using this 'low-
level red' means of demanding thanks from the people to show political loyalty [to 
superiors] harms not only the image of the ruling party and the government, but also 
seriously hurts the feelings of the people, ultimately becoming a form of political dis-
loyalty.” 
“Low-level red” can also occur at the highest of levels. In late February, even as China 
still struggled to contain the epidemic and its social and economic fallout, the CCP’s 
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Central Propaganda Department released a book in six languages called A Great Na-
tion Battles the Epidemic (大国战“疫”). According to the official Xinhua News 
Agency, the book was “a concentrated reflection of General Secretary Xi Jinping as 
the leader of a great nation, having feelings for the people, taking on the mission, 
showing strategic foresight and outstanding leadership” (Xinhua News Agency 2020). 
On March 8, just two days before Xi Jinping’s tour of Wuhan, media in Hong Kong 
reported that the book, which had drawn derision on social media, had been pulled 
from shelves. The Hong Kong outlet HK01 explained that such acts of “low-level red” 
are a symptom and legacy of authoritarian political cultures, even going back to China’s 
feudal era, in which civil servants stood to benefit from such flattery. “This ‘low-level 
red’ may seem to be cloaked in an outer garment of ‘political correctness’ conveying 
loyalty, but in fact it harbors an extremely selfish psychology of opportunism,” the 
article said. “What it actually accomplishes is to take the image of the leader and the 
nation and roast it over the fire, deconstructing rather than strengthening the image 
and power of the leader and the nation.” (HK01 2020) 
Ridicule surfaced again from the depths as Xi Jinping made his high-profile visit to 
Wuhan, meant to signal that China had successfully brought COVID-19 under control. 
This was a serious opportunity to project an image of strength, of Xi Jinping as the 
commander who had led the people to victory in the war against the coronavirus. Cen-
sorship of the media and the internet was correspondingly severe, the authorities keen 
to ensure that nothing spoiled the atmosphere of devotion. As controls snuffed out all 
attempts to counteract the all-consuming CCP narrative, Chinese on social media plat-
forms reached dizzying heights of creativity to make themselves heard.  
The day of Xi's tour, a series of feature stories had been published in China's People 
magazine. They included a lengthy interview in which the director of an emergency 
department at one local Wuhan hospital spoke out about her decision to share infor-
mation back in December 2019 about a patient suffering from a case of atypical pneu-
monia – what would later, after weeks of cover-up, be designated COVID-19. Ai Fen 
and other local Wuhan doctors had been harshly disciplined for daring to share infor-
mation about the emerging outbreak. In the interview, she affirmed the need to speak 
up, and said she regretted not having spoken out more forcefully. 
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As the Ai Fen interview was censored on the day of Xi Jinping’s Wuhan visit, internet 
users began sharing cloaked versions of the text in a viral effort to circumvent controls. 
One user shared a version that had been machine translated into Korean (but could 
easily be translated back into Chinese). Another rendered the text using emoticons. 
Still another managed to share the text by converting each of its Chinese characters 
into the unique five-digit codes once used in China to send telegraph messages.  
 
 
Three different versions of a censored in-depth report from China's People maga-
zine shared through the WeChat social platform, rendered in Korean (far left), in 
emoticons (center) and in telegraph codes. 
 
On the day of Xi’s glorious procession in Wuhan, Chinese found thousands of differ-
ent ways, each more creative than the next, to work around the CCP’s insecurities. 
Such acts of digital dissent are sure to continue, even as the Party itself turns to digital 
tools, like its study app for the ideas of Xi Jinping, in an effort to manufacture devotion 
as a means to charismatic power. And even as the authorities refine the technologies 
used to ferret out and obliterate acts of irreverence, hiding like “digital samizdat” in 
the corners of chatrooms and comment sections, the leadership will have to contend 
with the constant and unforeseen consequences of devotion itself (Barmé 2020). 
Whether through criticism or praise, the emperor is always exposed. 




An Xiao Mina. 2014. "Batman, Pandaman and the Blind Man: A Case Study in Social 
Change Memes and Internet Censorship in China." Journal of Visual Culture 13 
(3): 359–75. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1470412914546576. 
Bandurski, David. 2020. "When Propaganda Bites Back." China Media Project, 
March 8, 2020. Accessed January 14, 2021. https://chinamediapro-
ject.org/2020/03/08/when-propaganda-bites-back/.  
Bandurski, David. 2016. "An Ode to Big Brother." China Media Project (Medium), 
February 19, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2021. https://medium.com/china-media-
project/an-ode-to-big-brother-3ef46037e52d#.6lgvoyfx5.  
Barmé, Geremie R. 2020. "China’s Coronavirus Crisis Is Just Beginning." The New 
York Times, March 3, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/opinion/coro-
navirus-china-xi-jinping.html. 
BBC. 2016. "Southern Metropolis Daily' Fires Editor Due to Serious 'Guidance Error'" 
《南都》因严重“导向事故”开除编辑 ('Nandu' yin yanzhong 'daoxiang shigu' 
kaichu bianji), BBC (Chinese), March 1, 2016. Accessed January 14, 2021. 
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2016/03/160301_china_nandou_me-
dia_sacking. 
Brady, Anne-Marie. 2009. Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work 
in Contemporary China. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Buckley, Chris. 2016. "China’s Communist Party Declares Xi Jinping ‘Core’ Leader." 
The New York Times, October 27, 2016, Accessed January 14, 2021. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/world/asia/xi-jinping-china.html?_r=0. 
CCP. 2019. "CCP Central Committee Decision on Earnestly Studying, Disseminating 
and Implementing the Spirit of the 19th National Congress" 中共中央关于认真
学习宣传贯彻党的十九大精神的决定 (Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu renzhen 
xuexi xuanchuang guanche dang de shijiuda jingshen de jueding), Central Commit-
tee of the Chinese Communist Party, Xinhuanet.com, November 1, 2017. Ac-
cessed October 30, 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-
11/02/c_1121897813.htm. 
CCP. 2019. "CCP Central Committee Opinion on the Strengthening of Party Con-
struction" (zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dang de zhengzhi jianshe de 
234                                              Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies, vol. 1 (2020) 
 
 
yijian). People's Daily, February 28, 2019. Accessed October 30, 2020. 
http://dangjian.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0228/c117092-30906618.html. 
Cheek,Timothy. 1981. "Deng Tuo: Culture, Leninism and Alternative Marxism in the 
Chinese Communist Party." The China Quarterly, no.  87 (September 1981): 470–
91. 
Düben, Björn Alexander. 2018. "Xi Jinping and the End of Chinese Exceptionalism." 
Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 67, issue 2 (November 2018): 111–128. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1535274.  
Financial Times. 2017a. "Xi Jinping’s Top Team: China’s New Politburo Standing 
Committee," Financial Times, October 24, 2017.  Accessed October 14, 2021. 
https://www.ft.com/content/b5441a6a-b7d1-11e7-8c12-5661783e5589. 
Financial Times. 2017b. "China Tilts Back Towards a Cult of Personality." Financial 
Times, October 25, 2017. Accessed October 30, 2020. http://ft.com/con-
tent/628bab6e-b973-11e7-9bfb-4a9c83ffa852. 
HK01. 2020. "'A Battle Against Epidemic' Removed From Shelves: Low-level Red 
Must Stop" 《大國戰「疫」》遭下架 「低級紅」該休矣 ("da guo zhan 'yi'" 
zao xiajia 'dijihong' gai xiuyi), HK01.com, March 6, 2020. Accessed October 30, 
2020. https://bit.ly/34zisYD. 
Johnson, Christopher K. 2016. "Now China’s “Core” Leader, Xi Jinping Looks to 
Dominate Leadership Shuffle," Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), October 28, 2016. Accessed October 14, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analy-
sis/now-chinas-core-leader-xi-jinping-looks-dominate-leadership-shuffle. 
Ladányi, László. [Without year]. "The Ten Commandments of a China Watcher." 
from Pierre Ryckmans, archived at http://www.ladanyi.ch/lazlo-ladanyi/. 
Lee, Siu-yau. 2016. "Surviving Online Censorship in China: Three Satirical Tactics 
and their Impact." The China Quarterly vol. 228 (December 2016): 1061–80. 
Mao Zedong, "Doing News Work Requires Politicians Running the Newspapers." In 
Collection of Thoughts of Modern Chinese Press Advocates" 《中國現代報刊活
動家思想評傳》 (Zhongguo xiandai baokan huodongjia sixiang pingzhuan), ed-
ited by Hu Zhengqiang (Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2003): 28-30. 
MacFarquhar, Roderick. 1997. "The Curious Case of the ‘Three-Family Village’." in 
The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Volume 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm 
Bandurski: Working Around the CCP’s Insecurities                                                                     235 
 
 
1961-1966, ed. by Roderick MacFarquhar (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999). DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780192149978.003.0012 
Márquez, Xavier. 2018.  "Two Models of Political Leader Cults: Propaganda and Rit-
ual." Politics, Religion & Ideology 19:3 (August 2018): 265–84. 
O'Neill, Patrick Howell. 2019). "How WeChat Censors Private Conversations, auto-
matically in Real Time." MIT Technology Review, July 15, 2019. Accessed Octo-
ber 30, 2020. https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/07/15/134178/how-wechat-
censors-private-conversations-automatically-in-real-time/. 
Qian Gang. 2009. "An Anniversary Observation on Hu Jintao Press Policy" (Hu Jintao 
xinwen zhengce zhi zhounian guancha), Media Digest (RTHK), July 15, 2009. Ac-
cessed October 14, 2021. https://app3.rthk.hk/mediadigest/content.php?aid=923 
Qian Gang. 2018. "Chinese Discourse Report 2018." China Media Project, December 
30, 2018. Accessed October 14, 2020. http://chinamediapro-
ject.org/2018/12/30/china-discourse-report-2018/. 
Qian Gang. 2020. "The Delicate Dance of Loyalty." China Media Project, April 7, 
2020. Accessed October 14, 2020.  https://chinamediaproject.org/2020/04/07/the-
delicate-dance-of-loyalty/. 
Ramzy, Austin. 2014. "Musical Ode to Xi Jinping and His Wife Goes Viral." The New 
York Times, November 25, 2014. Accessed October 14, 2020. https://sino-
sphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/musical-ode-to-xi-jinping-and-his-wife-goes-
viral/. 
Repnikova, Maria and Fang Kecheng. 2015. "Behind the Fall of China’s Greatest 
Newspaper." FP, January 29, 2015. Accessed October 14, 2020. https://foreignpol-
icy.com/2015/01/29/southern-weekly-china-media-censorship/. 
Reuters. (2017). "No Cult of Personality Around Xi, Says Top China Party Academic." 
Reuters.com, November 6, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-poli-
tics-xi/no-cult-of-personality-around-xi-says-top-china-party-academic-i-
dUSKBN1D61DD. 
Rudolph, Josh. 2020. "Translation: Essay by Missing Property Tycoon Ren Zhiqiang." 
China Digital Times, March 13, 2020. https://bit.ly/37nxNNy. 
Shirk, Susan L. 2018.  "China in Xi’s “New Era”: The Return to Personalistic Rule." 
Journal of Democracy vol. 29 (2) (April 2018): 22–36. 
236                                              Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies, vol. 1 (2020) 
 
 
Tatlow, Didi Kirsten. 2016. "Hidden Message Suspected on Chinese Front Page, and 
Speculation Swirls." The New York Times, March 2, 2016, Accessed October 14, 
2020. https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20160303/c03chinapaper/en-us/.  
Wu Jin 吴金. 2019. "Remaining Alert to 'Low-level Red' and 'High-level Black' Caused 
by Improper Reporting" 谨防报道失当产生“低级红”“高级黑” (jinfang 
baodao shidang chansheng 'dijihong' 'gaojihei). Qiushi Journal, June 24, 2019, Ac-
cessed October 14, 2021. http://www.qstheory.cn/llqikan/2019-
06/24/c_1124664983.htm. 
Xinhua New Agency. 2020. "'A Battle Against Epidemic' is Published" 《大国战
“疫”》近期出版  ("da guo zhan 'yi'" jinqi chuban), Xinhua News Agency, Feb-
ruary 26, 2020. Accessed October 14, 2021.  http://www.xinhuanet.com/poli-
tics/2020-02/26/c_1125627516.htm. 
Yang Guobin. 2009.The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
Yang Haosheng. 2016. "The Political Transformation of Romantic Lyricism: Guo 
Moruo’s Classical-Style Poems in Response to Mao Zedong." in A Modernity Set 
to a Pre-Modern Tune, ed. Yang Haosheng. New York: Brill: 147–182. 
Yang Qingzhi. 2017.  "Guizhou Party Conference Hangs Portrait of Xi, and Twice in 
Five Days its Paper Shouts 'Great Leader Xi Jinping" 《貴州黨員大會高宣習頭
像，報紙五天兩度喊出‘偉大領袖習近平’》(guizhou dangyuan dahui gao-
xuan Xi touxiang, baozhi wutianliangdu hanchu 'weida lingxiu Xi Jinping), 
HK01.com, November 15, 2017. Accessed January 13, 2021. https://bit.ly/3bS0S6l 
Zhang Xinyang. 2015. "Does the Glory of the Multitudes Mean Less Than the De-
struction of a Single Individual?" 《萬人之譽不及一人之毀》 (wanren zhi yu buji 
yiren zhi hui), Essays Monthly, vol. 9 (September 2015): 6.    
Zhao Qiang 赵强. 2010. "Public Opinion Out of Control: A Catalyst for the Collapse 
of the Soviet Union" (yulun shikong: sulian jieti de cuihuaji), Qiushi Journal, No-
vember 01, 2010. Accessed January 13, 2021. https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20130826215604/http://www.qsth-
ory.cn/zxdk/2010/201021/201010/t20101030_54269.htm. 
Zuo, Mandy. 2018.  "Chinese Marathon Runner Loses Race After Marshal Tries to 
Hand Her National Flag Near Finish Line." South China Morning Post, November 
Bandurski: Working Around the CCP’s Insecurities                                                                     237 
 
 
19, 2018. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2173995/chinese-mar-
athon-runner-loses-race-after-marshal-tries-hand-her. 
  
 
 
 
